Page 74 - Cyber Defense eMagazine September 2023
P. 74

Why Did The Mercenaries Mutiny?

            The  reason  is  likely  multifactorial,  however  a cynic  might  say  it  was a  desperate  act of  a  man who
            overestimated his position in the system, his relationship with the president, and usefulness for the state,
            at the same time underestimating the impact of his challenges on key players in the regime (including
            intended targets like defense minister Sergei Shoigu, and chief of the general staff Valery Gerasimov,
            both of which are extremely close to Putin).

            It could be argued that the conflict between Prigozhin and the highest echelons of the army has been
            smoldering for years, or at least since 2018, when the Russian army deliberately let the US Air Force
            wipe out a unit of Wagner’s troops, near Syria’s Deir ez-Zor. It is alleged that the army’s high command
            resented  the  competition  of  overpaid  mercenaries,  bound  by  almost  no  rules,  and  did  not  intend  to
            accommodate  Wagner,  beyond  the  point  of  necessity.  This  inflamed  Prigozhin’s  anger,  fueling  his
            personal attacks on the defense minister and the chief of general staff, whom he has consistently attacked
            as corrupt, inefficient, incompetent, and generally unworthy of their positions. The behind-the-scenes war
            for the president’s favor was ultimately won by the army, rather than by the increasingly unmanageable
            warlord Prigozhin, who was clearly not content with his multi-billion-dollar business empire.

            The catalyst for the mutiny was the recent announcement by the Russian Ministry of Defense that all
            private military companies and volunteer units would have to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense,
            unifying the command structure at the front, under unambiguous military authority. This would mean the
            end of Wagner group‘s independence, jeopardy for Prigozhin’s billions, and sidelining of his nascent
            political power.

            The aim of the mutiny, therefore, was presumably to force the preservation of Wagner independence,
            and assert the role of Prigozhin as a powerful warlord with a personal army and ever-flowing revenue.
            The rebellion was arguably therefore not a question of overthrowing power structures, but an attempt to
            save this ‘enterprise’ in the hope that Wagner battlefield merits would be taken into account. As it stands,
            these merits are likely why Prigozhin has escaped the whole adventure with his life, albeit at the expense
            of his political power, and questionably greater expense of his business empire.

            Some contend that Prigozhin failed to appreciate that this action would become a public challenge to
            Putin  himself,  but  most  would  no  doubt  feel  that  it  is  almost  unbelievable  that  such  an  entrenched
            beneficiary of the system should have made such a huge error of judgement.



            The Cyber Perspective


            One of the crucial parts of Prigozhin’s power in Russia has been his media empire. This part of the
            business was officially shut down earlier this month, and other companies from the media group are
            reported  to  be  closing  in  the  coming  week.  Analysts  speculate,  however,  that  the  core  information
            operations and the psy-op part of the media group will be restructured and resurrected.

            The Kremlin needs the services provided by Prigozhin’s troll factories, and will likely seek to save the
            capability, under leadership of a different pro-Kremlin oligarch. Analysts speculate that this vacuum could






            Cyber Defense eMagazine – September 2023 Edition                                                                                                                                                                                                          74
            Copyright © 2023, Cyber Defense Magazine. All rights reserved worldwide.
   69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79