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Why Did The Mercenaries Mutiny?
The reason is likely multifactorial, however a cynic might say it was a desperate act of a man who
overestimated his position in the system, his relationship with the president, and usefulness for the state,
at the same time underestimating the impact of his challenges on key players in the regime (including
intended targets like defense minister Sergei Shoigu, and chief of the general staff Valery Gerasimov,
both of which are extremely close to Putin).
It could be argued that the conflict between Prigozhin and the highest echelons of the army has been
smoldering for years, or at least since 2018, when the Russian army deliberately let the US Air Force
wipe out a unit of Wagner’s troops, near Syria’s Deir ez-Zor. It is alleged that the army’s high command
resented the competition of overpaid mercenaries, bound by almost no rules, and did not intend to
accommodate Wagner, beyond the point of necessity. This inflamed Prigozhin’s anger, fueling his
personal attacks on the defense minister and the chief of general staff, whom he has consistently attacked
as corrupt, inefficient, incompetent, and generally unworthy of their positions. The behind-the-scenes war
for the president’s favor was ultimately won by the army, rather than by the increasingly unmanageable
warlord Prigozhin, who was clearly not content with his multi-billion-dollar business empire.
The catalyst for the mutiny was the recent announcement by the Russian Ministry of Defense that all
private military companies and volunteer units would have to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense,
unifying the command structure at the front, under unambiguous military authority. This would mean the
end of Wagner group‘s independence, jeopardy for Prigozhin’s billions, and sidelining of his nascent
political power.
The aim of the mutiny, therefore, was presumably to force the preservation of Wagner independence,
and assert the role of Prigozhin as a powerful warlord with a personal army and ever-flowing revenue.
The rebellion was arguably therefore not a question of overthrowing power structures, but an attempt to
save this ‘enterprise’ in the hope that Wagner battlefield merits would be taken into account. As it stands,
these merits are likely why Prigozhin has escaped the whole adventure with his life, albeit at the expense
of his political power, and questionably greater expense of his business empire.
Some contend that Prigozhin failed to appreciate that this action would become a public challenge to
Putin himself, but most would no doubt feel that it is almost unbelievable that such an entrenched
beneficiary of the system should have made such a huge error of judgement.
The Cyber Perspective
One of the crucial parts of Prigozhin’s power in Russia has been his media empire. This part of the
business was officially shut down earlier this month, and other companies from the media group are
reported to be closing in the coming week. Analysts speculate, however, that the core information
operations and the psy-op part of the media group will be restructured and resurrected.
The Kremlin needs the services provided by Prigozhin’s troll factories, and will likely seek to save the
capability, under leadership of a different pro-Kremlin oligarch. Analysts speculate that this vacuum could
Cyber Defense eMagazine – September 2023 Edition 74
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