Page 92 - Cyber Defense eMagazine June 2024
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Ransom

            Fortra has observed instances in which an adversary will gain access to an organization’s social media
            account then lock the organization out of it, promising to restore access in return for a ransom.  For
            companies  which  rely  heavily  on  social  media  for  marketing  and  advertising,  this  lockout  can  have
            devastating  impacts  on  revenue.    Smaller  organizations  without  high  level  contacts  at  social  media
            companies may struggle to regain access to their accounts via official support channels without paying
            the ransom and are most at risk to this cashout method.  For larger organizations who may be able to
            use connections to regain access, this approach is less effective but may still be attempted in concert
            with a threat to post damaging information using the stolen account if a ransom is not received quickly.



            The Tactics Behind the Campaign

            Like many phishing threats, this attack is initially delivered via email.  The adversary stays with a tried-
            and-true approach; impersonate a legitimate service (in this case Meta) and threaten the restriction or
            closure of the organization’s business account due to policy violations.  The adversary also takes basic
            steps to reinforce their fake identity, including modifying the Display Name section of the “From”: banking
            on the fact that the majority of email clients show this value most prominently, and hide or minimize the
            actual sending address.

            The adversary also makes use of generative AI technology.  Fortra observed several variations of the
            email lure, subject, and Display Name.  Fortra’s analysis strongly indicates that these emails were AI
            generated.  This is a textbook example of the benefits generative AI can provide to cybercriminals; by
            generating multiple high-quality phishing emails with minimal effort it both lowers barriers for adversaries
            without strong language skills as well as enables adversaries to scale their operation more effectively.
            The adversary also took pains to ensure that these malicious emails was delivered successfully.  First,
            emails attributed to this campaign were sent using infrastructure belonging to legitimate sales and email
            marketing  organizations.    By  leveraging  the  services  of  this  reputable  company,  adversaries  avoid
            deliverability problems caused by low reputation of their email infrastructure.  This abuse of legitimate
            SASS capabilities is a variation of a living off the land attack known as Living off Trusted Sites (LOTS).

            Additionally,  steps  were  taken  to  disguise  the  malicious  URL  leading  to  the  phishing  website.    The
            adversary leveraged a URL intermediary (in this case, Google notifications clicktracking), to mask the
            true destination of the URL.  In many instances the adversary further disguised the URL by embedding it
            within a QR code. While neither tactic is new, both are increasingly popular means of hiding the intent of
            the URL.  A growing number of phish are using QR phishing or Quishing as the primary lure in email
            attacks. At the time of writing, the volume of phish detected in this campaign using QR codes was more
            than three times greater than those using traditionally clickable links.  In addition to making it harder for
            automated software to scan the URL, the biggest benefit of a QR code based lure is that the victim
            finishes the interaction on their mobile device, which is likely not protected by the organization’s cyber
            defenses.








            Cyber Defense eMagazine – June 2024 Edition                                                                                                                                                                                                          92
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