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Mandab Strait, in Pakistan for an easy reach to the Ormuz Strait, or in Myanmar’s Coco Islands for quicker
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            access to the Strait of Malacca, the soon-to-be busiest waterway in the world . Thus, it comes with no
            surprise that Beijing is developing a power projection capability with blue-water navy maritime force to
            protect the flow of raw materials and merchandises.



            The New Regional Hegemon

            The current US uncertainty towards Northeast and Southeast Asia is a great opportunity for China, which
            has been more hawkish in the last few years. Beijing invested massively to create a modern and flexible
            army; the military budget doubled in 10 years, the first aircraft carrier is now deployed (with a second one
            under construction), and next-generation aircrafts are almost ready. All these efforts are possible thanks
            to  cyber  attacks  and  retro  engineering  prowess  and  enables  power  projection  to  support  an  Anti-
            Access/Area Denial tactic [A2/AD] to protect its activities in the South China Sea (aka the Nine-Dash
            Line).

            The People’s Republic of China (PRC) uses a mix of traditional (money) and cyber means (threat) to
            pressurize neighbors and protect its “strategic belt” (i.e. its coast, where most economic activities occur).
            In South East China, after a decade of cordial relations with some states through generous economic,
            commercial, infrastructural and cultural programs, the PRC shifted its approach and started to “flex its
            muscles”. In Malaysia, the President is concerned about debt issue and cancelled a $22 billion worth
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            project, such as the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), which is part of China’s BRI.  In the Philippines, the
            hard talk round seems to be over and both countries are trying  to resolve their maritime disputes; a
            meeting is schedule before the end of the year between both leaders.   Furthermore, long-established
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            allies  of  China,  like  Myanmar  and  Vietnam,  are  becoming  more  suspicious;  a  Chinese-backed  dam
            project in Myanmar is at risk and in 2017, Vietnamese banks and airports were hacked allegedly by
            Chinese state-sponsored groups.
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            Nevertheless, the lack of unity and capacity in the ASEAN will not stop China. ASEAN states can only
            sustain a low to medium intensity “gunboat diplomacy” even if the US deployed, to guarantee freedom of
            navigation, the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier, in addition to the permanent carrier that belongs to
                        th
            the Navy’s 7  Fleet based in Japan (USS Carl Vinson).








            10  HUANG Kristin. “Chinese defence adviser says Djibouti naval facility is a much-needed military base”, South China Morning Post, May 13, 2017
            http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2094194/chinese-defence-adviser-says-djibouti-naval-facility
            11  MA Alexander. “Malaysia stood up to China’s demands to hand over its persecuted Muslim prisoners, and Beijing is furious”, Business Insider, Oct 12,
            2018
            12  HEYDARIAN Richard, “Major Hurdles – and rewards – as China and Philippines try to forge deal to share South China Sea resources”, South China
            Morning Post, Sept 22, 2018
            https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2165237/major-hurdles-and-rewards-china-and-philippines-try-forge-deal
            13  LIVES Mike. “A Chinese-Backed Dam Project Leaves Myanmar in a Bind”, The New York Times, Mar 31, 2017
            https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/myanmar-china-myitsone-dam-project.html




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